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statute, a substantial equality is afforded the negro in another state
where unpleasantries need not be suffered. But, accepting this as a
solution, we are still confronted with the dilemma which arises when a
state more deeply southern, as Florida, attempts to enact a similar
statute. In Missouri the facilities of the adjacent state lend more to
the reasonableness of "equality", than in the case where the colored
applicant would find it necessary to traverse several states and hundreds
of miles to acquire the benefits offered him by the state.
To the crusader, acceptance of the doctrine set out in the instant
case may seem a flagrant violation of the "equal protection" guaranteed
citizens under the Federal Constitution, but to one more concerned
about the best interests of the colored race, the solution suggests itself
as a sane and acceptable answer to a difficult situation.
JOHN B. BRECKINImOE.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER WITH MALICE-NEGLIGENCE
The defendant, who had drunk five bottles of beer and was admit-
tedly not sober when he began drinking beer, drove out of town at
sixty miles per hour, swerved completely across a nine-foot highway
to his left, striking and killing two boys walking eight feet off the
pavement in the weed growth. Held, that evidence establishing these
facts was sufficient for the jury to find the driver guilty of murder
with "nalice". Coclcrell v. State, ...... Tex. Cr. R. ..- , 117 S. W. (2nd)
1105 (1938).
Texas has by statute created four degrees of culpable homicide:
(1) Negligent homicide in the first degree, (2) Negligent homicide In
the second degree, (3) Murder without malice, and (4) Murder with
malice.'
Without discussing what other degrees the defendant in this case
might have been convicted of, it is pertinent to see wherein the court
was justified in finding him guilty of murder with malice. It is to be
presumed, as the defendant was prosecuted under the general law gov-
erning homicide, with the intent "to prove, if possible, a killing with
malice," that instructions were properly submitted to the jury.2 Since
it was held that the evidence was sufficient to justify the jury in finding
the defendant guilty of murder with "malice", the important considera-
tion of what constitutes "malice aforethought" or "malice" in this case
is of primary concern.
In determining what constitutes malice here, the court cited and
followed the case of Banks v. State, in which it had been said that
"Malice may be toward a group of persons as well as toward an indi-
vidual. It may exist without former grudges or antecedent menaces.
The intentional doing of any wrongful act in such manner and under
such circumstances as that the death of a human being may result
therefrom is malice."' Collins v. State' decided malice to be "a state
CASE COMMENTS
or condition of the mind showing a heart regardless of social duty and
fatally bent on mischief, the existence of which is inferred from acts
committed or words spoken."
On the subject of malice in reference to murder, we may take the
treatment by Stephen as probably best expressing the views of most
of the common law writers. It is the second state of mind which he
describes as meaning malice which fits the case under review.6 This
state has been variously termed as "a general malignity of heart",
"the heart regardless of social duty and deliberately bent on mischief",8
"such a willful act as shows him to be an enemy of all mankind",' etc.
However phrased it is essentially the same thing as expressed in the
quotation 'from the Banks case.
In the case of Simmons v. State, the charge given by the trial
court to the effect that "The intentional doing of an unlawful act in
IVernon's Ann. P. C., arts. 1230 to 1257c.
'Art. 1257b of the Penal Code states, with reference to instruc-
tions: "In all cases tried under the provisions of the Act, it shall be
the duty of the court to define 'malice aforethought', and shall apply
that term by appropriate charge to the facts in the case, and shall
Instruct the jury that unless from all the facts and circumstances in
evidence the jury believes the defendant was prompted and acted with
his malice aforethought, they cannot assess the punishment at a period
longer than five years."
'85 Tex. Cr. R. 165, 211 S. W. 217 (1919).
'108 Tex. Cr. R. 72, 299 S. W. 403 (1927).
6 "In reference to murder, 'malice'-means any one of the follow-
ing states of mind, preceding or co-existing with the act or omission by
which death is caused:
"(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm
to, any person, whether such person is the person actually killed or
not.
"(b) Knowledge that the act which causes death will probably
cause the death of, or grievous bodily harm to, some person, whether
such person is the person actually killed or not, although such knowl-
edge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily
harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused.
"(c) An intent to commit any felony whatever.
"(d) An intent to oppose by force any officer of justice on his
way to, in, or returning from the execution of the duty of arresting,
keeping in custody, or imprisoning any person whom he is lawfully
entitled to arrest, keep in custody, or imprison, or the duty of keeping
the peace, or dispersing an unlawful assembly, provided that the
offender has notice that the person killed is such officer so employed
." 3 Hist. Crim. Law of Eng. (1883) 22.
' This phase of homicide was given extensive treatment in the
Report of the Law Revision Commission of the State of New York
(1937), Sec. 3, pp. 103-131. There we find this recommendation: "The
proposal, therefore, which seems most desirable would retain within
the murder section only that part of "depraved mind" cases in which
an intent to kill existed, although directed toward no specific indi-
vidual." (Page 131.)
SI East, Pleas of the Crown (1803), 269.
'Foster, Crown Law (3d ed., 1809), 262.
'4 Bladkstone, Commentaries, p. 200.
M113 Tex. Cr. R. 53, 19 S. W. (2nd) 44 (1929). It was further
said: "Negligent homicide in the second degree is defined in articles
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such manner and under such circumstances as that the death of a
human being may result therefrom is malice" did not meet the approval
of the Court of Appeals. The court there recognized that an act which
may result in death to some one cannot form the basis of an inferred
malice unless the likelihood of such death resulting is so great that no
reasonable man and only one who has a reckless and wanton disregard
for the consequences would do it.
It is unfortunate that the decision of the Banks case is couched in
such strong inclusive language." The court reached the right result
but the idea must not be fostered that every unlawful act resulting in
homicide will sustain an inference of malice on which to predicate a
verdict of murder.
Whether the defendant in the Co krell case be regarded as doing
an unlawful act or as doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner, he did
it in a manner "evincing a heart regardless of social duty" and from
that the law will imply malice.
CONVEYANCES-VALIDITY OF PAROL AGREEMENTS AS TO
DETERMINABLE BOUNDARY LINES
A and B owned adjoining patents of land granted on the same day
and lying between two tracts of land to which A later acquired title.
A conveyed to B parts of these two tracts of land, described as being
below a certain previously made and partly marked out line which
passed over one tract of land, over B's land, and then over the other
tract. It is the space between where this line passed over B's land
and the original dividing line between A's and B's patents which is In
dispute. Plaintiff derives title from A and seeks to enjoin trespass on
the part of the defendants, who hold under B. Plaintiff claims that
the boundary line between their lands is not the boundary as set out
in the original grants but the line as set out in the conveyance from
A to B, which has been agreed upon and recognized for many years.
Held: The land in dispute belongs to defendants. Howard v. Howard
et al., 271 Ky. 773, 113 S. W. 2d. 434 (1938).
The deed which traced the line claimed by plaintiff as the true line
did not purport to establish a divisional line but only to convey certain
land in other patents and so the original boundary was not affected.
It was contended that the line claimed by plaintiff had long been the
agreed line, but the court held that there could have been no valid parol
1238-1243 P. C., and comprehends the doing of an unlawful act, which
act the doer may clearly intend to do, yet in charging the jury in such
case it would be entirely proper to tell them that one who did by neg-
ligence and carelessness cause the death of a human being would be
guilty of negligent homicide in the second degree, etc., and this would
be true, even though the facts show the wrongful act to have been
intentionally done. That the 'unlawful act' referred to was done inten-
tionally would not make such homicide one upon malice."
ngupra, paragraph 4.
